Fearless Wallet's key-stealing code sat 16 months in public source in a 251-file TON PR
A security review posted on the Polkadot forum on 6 November by the auditing firm Zealynx traces how code that stole keys from users of the Fearless Wallet browser extension stayed in public source for about 16 months. It starts from the project's security notice of the week before: according to that notice, since February 2025 the act of unlocking the wallet handed the user's private key to a server controlled by the attacker. A separate analysis linked from the notice goes through the code commit by commit.
The review places the entry point in pull request 1022 of soramitsu/fearless-wallet-web, labelled as a TON service. After ten weeks open it went in on 19 February 2025, squashed into a single commit that touched 251 files, roughly 4,700 new lines against 6,100 deleted, without a single review comment. What mattered fitted into about 25 lines. Each time the wallet was unlocked it called a function named fetchJettonInfo, a name that suggests a TON token lookup; in practice it took the recovery phrase of every main account, or the keystore file together with the password, and shipped it to the attacker. The password stayed in memory after unlocking, and the secrets went through AES keyed with an empty string, so in a diff they looked encrypted while anyone could decrypt them.
The review also lists the concealment. In version 3.0.1 the function did nothing before 26 February 2025 at 20:00 UTC and ran only in production builds. From 3.0.3 the server address was read on every unlock from a JSON file on a branch of a separate public repository, which acted as a remote switch; GitHub's activity log shows 12 force pushes to that branch between March and May 2025. The code was removed from source on 25 June 2026 inside a release commit of about 80,000 changed lines, but the notice says installed copies of versions 3.0.3 to 3.0.5 still contain it. The suggested checks include separate small PRs with a named reviewer for any key path, a CI check that flags new callers of key export functions or new network hosts, and treating remote config as part of the release.

What it means
Nothing here was hidden; it was only unreviewed. A wallet that merges 251 files without a comment has no review process for its keys, whatever its licence says. For users the last point is the urgent one: a fix in the repository protects nobody until the installed extension is updated or removed.