Three Bitcoin Core disclosures, one rule: details wait until the last vulnerable series is dead
Bitcoin Core published three vulnerability disclosures on 10 November 2026, and all three follow the project's disclosure policy in the same way: the fixes shipped in October 2025, and the details came out only after the last affected release series, 29.x, reached end of life on 27 October 2026. Read together, they also show three different ways a node's assumptions can be used against it.
The first, CVE-2025-62859, is about compact blocks, rated Medium. Affected nodes cleared their download state after reconstructing a compact block but before checking it for witness malleation. If that check failed, the node fell back to asking the same peer for the full block, with a ten-minute timeout. A malicious peer that announced a block first could stall block processing, and if it controlled all three high-bandwidth peers, or the victim ran with -blocksonly, repeat it indefinitely (Bitcoin Core). Eugene Siegel reported it in April 2025; it was fixed in 30.0 and 29.2.
The second, CVE-2025-62860, also Medium, is the one with the widest reach. Bitcoin Core sees an inbound Tor peer as coming from the Tor daemon's address, usually the same machine or local network. The -whitelist option, which lifts DoS limits and privacy protections for trusted peers, could be set as an IP range, and if that range covered the Tor proxy, every inbound Tor connection inherited the trust. Popular node packages bundled Tor and set exactly such a range, and the option was an operational requirement for some client software, which the disclosure says led to thousands of reachable mainnet nodes whitelisting all incoming Tor traffic. Since 30.0, 29.2 and 28.3, inbound connections on an onion bind are never whitelisted (Bitcoin Core). Martin Zumsande and Antoine Poinsot found it and also notified Bitcoin Knots and affected vendors.
The third, CVE-2025-62861, rated High, let TRUC sibling eviction run while reorged transactions were being restored, leaving a mempool that could no longer produce a valid block template until restart (Bitcoin Core). Coinbrief covers it separately today.

The common thread
Each bug is a mismatch between what the code assumed and what the network could present: a block whose witness could be malleated after reconstruction, a connection whose source address was really a proxy, a block topology that mempool policy forbids but consensus allows. None required breaking cryptography.
What operators should check
All three are fixed in 30.0 and later, and in the late 28.x and 29.x point releases that are now unsupported. The Tor finding has a specific action beyond upgrading: anyone running a node package with Tor should check whether -whitelist covers the proxy's address range, because the vendor may have set it.