The path nobody watched: Unocoin's backup keys, hardware nonces and the drops xrpl.js lost
Three stories from this week's crypto infrastructure news have the same shape. In each, a control watches one path while value can move along another.
At Unocoin, the control was a freeze. The Indian exchange asked BitGo to freeze its enterprise account after unauthorised activity on 6 November, and according to both the exchange and BitGo the freeze held. The disputed transfers were signed with the user and backup keys that Unocoin itself held and broadcast without BitGo. BitGo's documentation describes that route plainly: the backup key can pair with the user key for recovery, and withdrawal policies apply only to transactions that involve BitGo. The freeze covered the normal path; the recovery path, which exists so a customer is never locked out, was outside it.
In hardware wallets the second path is the nonce. Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #431 describes two draft BIPs from Connor Avila that would let a host contribute randomness to each signature and then check that the device used it. Without that check, a compromised device can leak its seed through nonces that look normal, and nothing the host verifies about the transaction itself will reveal it. The proposal adds PSBT fields so the check can run on every spend, and Avila notes the cryptography still needs review.
In xrpl.js the second path is the number type. Since version 3.0.0, dropsToXrp() returned a JavaScript number, which cannot hold every drop above about 8.6 billion XRP; a round trip near the supply cap can lose up to 15 drops. The fix to return a BigNumber was merged on 5 November and then reverted on main on 12 November because it is a breaking change, so it will ship in 6.0.0 after a 5.4.0 release. Code that checks balances with the current function sees a value that has already been rounded.
What links the three is that the control was real and worked as designed. The freeze froze, the device produced valid signatures, the conversion returned a number. In each case the gap lay in a path the control was never meant to cover: recovery signing, nonce generation and floating-point representation.

Why it matters
Audits tend to test whether a control works. These cases argue for asking what the control does not see. For an exchange that means listing every key combination that can sign; for a wallet, verifying how a signature was made and not only that it is valid; for a library user, reading the type a function returns before trusting it with money.